Profit-sharing rules applied together with open-book accounting are a synergetic combination that encourages SME networks to continuous innovation. This paper studies profit-sharing rules that work as incentives for cost reduction in networks. We describe a case study of a steel-roof manufacturing and assembly network, where profit sharing became relevant shortly after open-book accounting was successfully implemented. Moreover, we present a dynamic game theoretic model for the study of the desired characteristics of profit-sharing rules in such networks. We find that, under quite general assumptions, profit-sharing rules need to satisfy certain conditions in order to encourage the network partners to announce their cost-reducing ideas immediately. A suitable and simple profit-sharing rule is the combination rule which rewards the innovator and the target of cost reduction.
cult to base the profit sharing on exact value or cost figures calculated afterwards. Further to this recognition, Jarimo et al. (2005) have studied profit sharing in the context of network cost-reduction. Their approach does not have the problems Rese (2005) mentions, because they only measure the sizes of cost reductions. Another context where incentive contracts have been studied is one-of-a-kind project procurement (e.g. Scherer 1964, Bajari and Tadelis 2001) , but these studies are not completely eligible for partnership networks, which should be seen as processes rather than entities (Cousins 2002) . Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) , in turn, study supplier investment-incentives in a setting where the principal controls the number of suppliers. In an open-book network it is, however, infeasible to continuously make the suppliers compete against each other.
In general, profit sharing and incentive contracts have been studied extensively in the field of game theory (e.g. Moulin 1988 ). For instance, Corbett and DeCroix (2001) study the interesting case where the principal wants to save through decreasing the amount of materials purchased from suppliers. They show that incentive contracts can increase the profit of the supply chain, but do not necessarily result in reduced consumption. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) , in turn, focus on benefit sharing with retailers. In particular, they compare revenue sharing to other supply-chain contracts, concluding that in some cases revenue sharing may be administratively too expensive.
In this paper, our objective is to find profit-sharing rules that work as incentives for network partners to reduce their costs immediately when opportunities for cost reduction are identified. We call such opportunities cost-reduction options, which belong to the vast set of real options. We take the same approach as Jarimo et al. (2005) by applying game theory in order to capture the possibly conflicting interests of network partners. However, our work extends theirs by accounting for multiple successive cost-reduction options, while their paper considers the case of only one cost-reduction action at a time. Moreover, we show that the possibility of successive cost-reduction options may alter the situation.
In addition to theorists, network managers call for practical profit-sharing rules. To illustrate this, we describe the real-life case of a steel-roof manufacturer that uses subcontractors to assemble the steel roofs at construction sites. Open-book accounting was implemented in the network so as to efficiently identify cost-reduction options. Consequently, when the subcontractors announced cost savings, also the need for profit-sharing rules emerged. In this case, the profit-sharing rules together with open-book accounting has a positive influence on the network's spur to continuous innovation in terms of cost reduction.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes a case network where open-book accounting was successfully implemented and the need for profitsharing rules emerged. Section 3 constructs a dynamic game model for cost reduction and studies suitable profit-sharing rules. Section 4 discusses the managerial implications of our theoretical results and Section 5 concludes. For this purpose, external researchers from a research institute were asked to carry out a network development project. people (the proportion of sales in the roof business was ca. 2%), while the average annual sales for roof assemblers was about 0.3Me and the average number of employees was four. Thus, the network can be classified as a regional, operative SME network with hierarchical structure (Pfohl and Buse 2000) . Within the roof building service, Roof & Steel delivers customer service, design, production, logistics, and everything else but the roof assembly and sales.
Generic cost model and process development simulation
The interests of Roof & Steel and the individual roof assembly firms met as regards costs and quality of the assembly service. Firstly, Roof & Steel wanted to make the assemblers more aware of the cost structure of the assembly work and, as a result, to make them more active in controlling the costs of the overall operations. Most of the roof assemblers worked exclusively or primarily for Roof & Steel. The direct cost was controlled by Roof & Steel who owned all roof material. The assemblers were responsible for all wasted material and the assemblers paid their employees only for performed working hours. Hence, direct costs were known quite well in each assembly order.
Because the pricing between the assembly firms and Roof & Steel was based on an agreed lump sum per assembled roof, the roof assemblers calculated all their indirect costs and split the annual sum equally between the different assemblies. The lump sum was negotiated with Roof & Steel based on two parameters: The size (in square meters) and the complexity (number of corners and skylight windows of house) of assembled roof.
Roof & Steel paid these lump sums according to same principles to all assemblers because they expected competition between assemblers to keep costs down. The period of year influenced costs, but it was on the assemblers' risk and they mainly did not assemble in January (the coldest month). This procedure caused an increase in assembly costs, because the assembly firms did not actually control their indirect costs, which represented a high percentage of total costs. Instead, they only calculated them afterwards and tried to add them to the next year's margin in negotiations. At the same time, the assembly firms were concerned about their competitiveness because Roof & Steel expected a decreasing price trend while the assemblers' group-level costs seemed to be increasing. In this situation, most of the assembly firms felt helpless because they did not find a solution for reducing the costs of direct work. At the same time, almost all the assemblers felt that Roof & Steel is such an important and advanced principal that they want to keep on working for it. Therefore, in order to deepen the understanding of end customers' profitability, the cost structures of roof assembly work and roof assembly firms were modelled.
Secondly, a new cost model for the total costs of an assembly firm was developed so that all their cost elements were expressed as parameters that could have different values. This kind of simulation means, for example, that by inserting a new purchase price and new usage (driving kilometres) for the assembly groups' lorries, the new total annual costs of assembly firms were simulated. These total costs were further assigned to individual assembly sites. Similarly, the total network could easily simulate the cost-saving potential by changing the parameters of any of the simulated issues. For example, moving from a too big office to a smaller one (half of the size) could result in annual savings of 4200e for a roof assembler because the lower rent per month is assigned to assembled roofs instead of the higher rent.
The novelty in the simulation was the exact figures for each decision and the easiness to make this kind of simulation. Now, the roof assemblers could easily compare whether e.g. moving to a smaller office would bring more or less savings than reducing reclamations.
At the network level, Roof & Steel could focus on recommending practises that would lead to the highest cost-saving potential.
Thirdly, the annual sales to Roof & Steel were added to the model in order to control and simulate profit as well. By adding the sales, the assembly firms were able to simulate also the work load for assembly groups and individual employees, and to calculate how many new roof assemblies (sales) are needed in order to launch a new assembly group profitably.
In the simulation, averages for direct costs and revenues were applied. These averages were calculated from the 2004 Roof & Steel roof sales and assembly data. The average was named 'standard roof assembly'. It is reasonable to believe that the variety of the roofs assembled will not change too much due to rather conservative consumers in this field. Using the expected number of standard roof assemblies simplified the model so that the input data could be based on averages.
Who gets the benefit?
After the new cost model and the simulation tool had been developed, a rather unusual initiative from the network group took place: The entire SME network including Roof & Steel wanted to organise training for the wider group of roof assemblers in order to get all assemblers together to discuss cost issues. The purpose of the training was to intro-6 duce and instruct the use of the new management accounting tools as well. The training included shaping the characteristics of doing business within networks, introducing the average cost structure of roof assemblies, and simulating the most typical decisions of the assembly firms including, for example, the types of lorries used, the ways to handle customer complaints, the specific needs for having an office, etc. All these phases were interactive so that the information needs of the assemblers were taken into account. The average cost structure was easily accepted by the assemblers because the original values for cost elements were taken from their own firms and reflected the experienced economic reality rather well.
During the simulation phase, an active discussion and analysis regarding the effect of alternative decisions on the total profitability of firms began. Almost all participants wanted to change some or all of the figures in the simulation to meet their own economic situation. An assembler captured the point: "I did not know that the customer complaints have so much influence on the poor profitability." In general, the cost awareness increased by the simulation. Even though the overall cost structure of the assembly firms was not very well-known before the development process, the most important benefit for them in the future is expected to result from the simulation, because in all decisions regarding the simulated parameters, the assembly firm can now foresee the economic effect on the annual result before making the decision.
After the training, all assemblers decided to adopt the new cost model and the simulation.
Since the assemblers were shown that they can improve their profitability through changes in the process or in the firms' infrastructure, they may also now have more incentives than before to reduce costs and to execute the commonly agreed actions. The awareness regarding cost reductions has primarily relied on removing the profitability advantage from the assemblers to Roof & Steel by reducing assembly prices. With the cost structure simulation, assemblers could see that reducing prices does not have to mean reducing profitability. In contrast, a win-win situation of reducing prices with half of the cost 7 reductions was simulated.
The most significant problems from Roof & Steel point of view were, after the process, that they had invested alone in the network development, all roof assemblers did not immediately take advantage on the evident cost-reduction opportunities, and some roof assemblers did not commit to the decreasing prices. There were no formal agreements or rules between Roof & Steel and the assemblers on how to proceed with the results of new cost simulations. This led the assemblers to unnecessarily postpone their cost-reduction efforts and to hold the old pricing agreements.
Currently, there is a risk that some assemblers may be replaced by new ones, which might ruin their business and increase the searching costs of Roof & Steel. Hence, there seems to be an actual need to formalise such profit-sharing rules that provide incentives for all network members to immediately bring all their process development ideas into the joint discussion. Otherwise the open-book accounting case may lead to exploitation of a partner or misuse of confidential information in other business relationships.
3 Game theoretic model of cost-reduction options 3.1 Sharing profits from cost-reduction options As described in the above case, open-book accounting increases the chances of identifying actions that reduce costs in the operations of one or more partners. We call the possibility to reduce costs a cost-reduction option. For instance, a cost-reduction option would be the opportunity to terminate the lease of a storage space if no inventory is needed. We say that the cost-reduction option is exercised if the necessary actions are taken so that costs are actually reduced. In the lease example, the termination of the contract exercises the option. Moreover, the owner of an option is the one who has the potential to exercise it. Naturally, it would be optimal for the network if all cost-reduction options were exercised immediately when identified. However, the network partners may be unsure about the effect of cost-reduction on their profits, which may cause the postponing of exercise or even abandoning the options. To overcome this problem, Jarimo et al. (2005) suggest that the network should have ex-ante agreed profit-sharing principles for cases when costreduction options are exercised. Furthermore, they have studied the applicability of some game theoretic utility-sharing rules to such cases. However, their setting of cost-reduction options is static in the sense that it does not account for multiple successive options.
In the following, we extend the model of Jarimo et al. (2005) and study the desired characteristics of profit-sharing rules when successive cost-reduction options may emerge.
Specifically, we consider a setting where all network partners identify cost-reduction options according to some stochastic process and the sizes of the corresponding cost-savings are random too. Thus, if all options are exercised as soon as they emerge, the total costs follow a decreasing cumulative stochastic process. For instance, Figure 2 depicts a realisation of such process.
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Although it would be globally optimal to exercise all options immediately, the owner of the option looks for the private benefit. Hence, if the owner thinks that his/her profit from the option increases in the future, then the owner will not exercise it immediately.
In consequence, the profit-sharing rules need to be such that the profit from exercising options does not increase with time.
When a subcontractor exercises a cost-reduction option, the cost saving needs to be shared among different objects. In practise, the possibilities are, first, to increase the margin of the subcontractor ( Figure 3a) ; second, to increase the margin of the principal by reducing the price paid to the subcontractor ( Figure 3b) ; third, to decrease the price of the end product (Figure 3c ). In the three figures, the arrow represents the size of the cost saving. First, in Figure 3a ) the price paid to the subcontractor, whose costs reduce, is left unchanged, thus the subcontractor's margin increases. Second, in Figure 3b ) the end-product price is kept fixed while the price paid to the subcontractor is decreased by the amount of the cost saving. In this case, the subcontractor's margin remains the same, whereas the principal's margin increases. Third, Figure 3c) shows the case where both the price paid to the subcontractor and the end-product price are decreased by the amount of the cost saving. Hence, the subcontractor's and the principal's margins stay unchanged, but the competitiveness of the network increases due to the reduction of the end-product price.
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In competitive markets, the end-product price needs to be in relation to the value delivered to a customer (e.g. Porter 1996) . Moreover, there is no reason to reduce the end-product price more than what it requires to outperform rivals. Thus, it makes sense to set an aspiration level for the end-product price, and when this level is reached, the surplus from cost reductions can be used to increase the profits of the network partners. Naturally, this requires continuous monitoring of the market positions in order to be aware of one's own position relative to competitors.
Mathematical formulation of profit sharing
Formally, let us denote the network's principal by M and the set of its subcontractors by N = {1, . . . , n}. The principal is distinguished from the subcontractors due to its exclusive position in the network. Let s denote a total saving due to the exercise of a cost-reduction option. Moreover, let x i denote the share of s allocated to increase the margin of subcontractor i, let x M denote the principal's share, and x p the share allocated to end-product price-reduction. Hence, i x i + x M + x p = s. The problem is, therefore, to determine the allocation x = (x 1 , . . . , x n , x M , x p ), where x i is the profit to company i from the exercise of cost-reduction option s.
Let r(t) denote the desired end-product price level, or reference price at time t. Moreover, let p(t) denote the network's end-product price at time t, commensurable to r(t). The reference price is the lowest market price of a competing product with an equal customerperceived value as the network's end product. In other words, if the network can offer its end product at price p = r, its product is on the efficient frontier, where the customerperceived value can not be increased without increasing the price (Figure 4) . Furthermore, if the network can price its end product lower than r(t), it determines a new standard for efficiency and thereby gains advantage against competitors.
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We wish to study profit-sharing rules that share the profits depending on, first, the network's end-product price level p(t), second, the reference price r(t), and third, the total saving s. The following definition summarises these ideas.
Definition 1 A profit-sharing rule φ(p, r, s) : R 3 + → R n+2 + determines the profit-allocation vector x when the cost-reduction option s is exercised. The profit-allocation given by φ is denoted by (φ 1 , . . . , φ n+2 ).
The reasons for the above definition are the following. First, if the network's current endproduct price is much greater than the reference price, i.e. the difference p − r is big, then the network would prefer a larger share of the saving to be used to price reduction (x p ) than if the difference is small or negative. Second, when p < r the utility from a saving can be allocated to increase the network partners' profits, since the network already creates value more efficiently than its competitors. To reflect the fact that competition and technological development eventually enables higher value creation even with similar costs, also referred to as price erosion, we assume the following.
Assumption 1 r(t) is non-increasing in t, i.e. r(t 1 ) ≥ r(t 2 ), ∀ t 1 < t 2 .
Moreover, we assume several desirable characteristics of the profit-sharing rule, described as follows. First, we assume that if the network's end-product price is higher than the reference price, then the end-product price reduction is allocated a greater share than otherwise.
Assumption 2 p 1 ≥ r and p 2 < r ⇒ φ n+2 (p 1 , r, s) > φ n+2 (p 2 , r, s).
Second, the basic assumption of an incentive profit-sharing rule is that it is individually rational, i.e. that the subcontractors' share of a saving is non-negative (Luce and Raiffa 1957) .
Third, Pareto optimality guarantees that all utility will be shared:
Finally, we wish to set the incentives so that the profit to a subcontractor from exercising a cost-reduction option does not increase with time. This is because otherwise the subcontractor would have the incentive to hold the option, which is not globally optimal. Hence, we would prefer a profit-sharing rule that is time compatible, defined as follows.
Definition 2 The profit-sharing rule φ is time compatible if
Thus, our main assumption is:
Assumption 5 φ is time compatible.
Of Assumptions 2-5, the last one is the most difficult property of a profit-sharing rule.
Hence, in the following, we focus on time compatibility when we try to identify suitable profit-sharing rules that work as incentives to exercise cost-reduction options.
Profit sharing between one subcontractor and a principal
We begin our analysis of profit-sharing rules with the case of one subcontractor, whereby the profit-allocation vector is x = (x 1 , x M , x p ). Moreover, (φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 ) denotes the corresponding allocation given by profit-sharing rule φ. Based on the above discussion, we define the following family of profit-sharing rules.
Definition 3 F 3 is the family of profit-sharing rules φ(p, r, s), such that φ :
In words, a φ ∈ F 3 is a profit-sharing rule that -when a subcontractor exercises a costreduction option -gives the allocation (x 1 , x M , x p ), accounting for the network's endproduct price p, the reference price r, and the size of the cost saving s.
An example of a φ ∈ F 3 is the proportional utility sharing rule, which has been suggested to offer theoretically sound solutions for profit sharing (e.g. Kalai 1977, Chun and Thomson 1990) . It is also the most commonly used rule in business (Thomson 2003) .
Example 1
The proportional profit-sharing rule applied for one subcontractor and principal is
where i α i = i β i = 1, α i , β i > 0 and α 3 > β 3 .
In this example, when the end-product price is above the reference price, a greater share is allocated to the end-product price-reduction than if p is below r. This is desirable for the network in order to prevent losing market share if p > r. Defining the vectors α and β, the network can decide how aggressively it will transfer the cost-savings to the end-product price. Clearly, φ PROP satisfies Assumptions 2-4. However, it is not obvious when φ PROP is time compatible (Assumption 5). Thus, the following proposition formalises this for
Proposition 1 A profit-sharing rule φ ∈ F 3 is time compatible if and only if φ satisfies the following conditions
Proof. See Appendix A In other words, the above proposition states that if the profit-sharing rule φ satisfies certain monotonicity (i) and subadditivity (ii) conditions, the value of a cost-reduction option does not increase with time. This implies that it is optimal for the subcontractor to exercise all cost-reduction options as soon as they emerge. To clarify these conditions, the monotonicity condition (i) says that the profit to a subcontractor will not increase if there is price erosion in the end-product. The subadditivity condition (ii), in turn, says that combining two successive cost-reduction options will not result in a greater benefit to the owner than exercising the options separately. This makes it non-profitable for the owner to wait for new options that may emerge. For instance, we can use this result to make φ(p, r, s) PROP time compatible:
Example 2 The proportional profit-sharing rule φ(p, r, s) PROP (see Example 1) becomes time compatible if we assume that α 1 ≤ β 1 (by (i) of Proposition 1).
Profit sharing with n subcontractors
In the case with n subcontractors, we search for an allocation x = (x 1 , . . . , x n , x M , x p ).
Correspondingly to the setting with one subcontractor, we give the following definition.
Definition 4 F n is the family of profit-sharing rules φ(p, r, s), such that φ :
That is, we let (φ 1 , . . . , φ n+2 ) denote the allocation given by profit-sharing rule φ ∈ F n .
With more than one subcontractor we face the problem that for an individual subcontractor it may be profitable to wait that others exercise their cost-reduction options first.
Therefore, in this case Proposition 1 does not apply, which can be reasoned through the following counterexample. Consider a rule where 75% of the cost saving is used in endproduct price decrease if p > r and the rest 25% is given to the owner of the cost-reduction option. Furthermore, if p ≤ r, then 25% is used to decrease the price and the rest 75% is given to the owner. Although this rule satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1, it is profitable for an owner to wait until others exercise their options and let the end-product price decrease. If the price decreases below the reference level (p ≤ r), the owner is better off by exercising his/her options only then, rather than by exercising them earlier when p > r. Consequently, this profit-sharing rule is not time compatible with n ≥ 2.
There are at least two ways to overcome this difficulty. First, the principal can define a (p, r) pair to each subcontractor individually. This would reduce the incentive structure back to the case with only one subcontractor. However, determining and updating ps and rs separately to several subcontractors can be too costly. Second, the principal can try to formulate a profit-sharing rule that uses general values for p and r, and is time compatible even with n subcontractors. As was shown by the above counterexample, this requires additional constraints to those introduced in Proposition 1.
We consider the broad family of proportional profit-sharing rules with the extra information about the owner of the cost-reduction option. We define this family as follows.
Definition 5 F RWRD is the family of proportional profit-sharing rules φ(p, r, s), such that
where δ, ξ ≥ 0 denote an extra share to the owner of the cost-reduction option, denoted
The family F RWRD contains a rich class of profit-sharing rules, which allow the rewarding of the innovator by defining the δ, ξ > 0. Moreover, each φ ∈ F RWRD clearly satisfies Assumptions 2-4. For time compatibility (Assumption 5), we however need to specify additional constraints as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A profit-sharing rule φ ∈ F RWRD is time compatible if and only if
Proof. See Appendix A On one hand, the above proposition states that when significant price reduction is needed,
i.e. when the network's end-product price is higher than that of competitors (p ≥ r), then the innovator's extra share δ should be greater than the extra share ξ when the product is competitively priced (p < r). Otherwise, it could be profitable for the innovator to wait that others exercise their cost-reduction options first.
On the other hand, the difference between δ and ξ must be less than the difference the proportional rule would yield if the subcontractor in question would not have been the innovator, i.e. δ − ξ ≤ β i − α i . This restriction discourages the innovator to wait for the reference price r to drop.
Thus, Proposition 2 yields constraints for rewarding the owner of the cost-reduction option, who can be any of the n subcontractors. These boundaries guarantee that the owner does not profit from delaying the exercise of the options.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Let φ ∈ F RWRD be time compatible. Then, β i ≥ α i ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. From Proposition 2 it follows that, for a time compatible φ ∈ F RWRD ,
In words, Corollary 1 states that when significant price reduction is needed (p > r), then the share to all subcontractors should not be more than when the product is competitively priced (p < r).
We give three examples of profit-sharing rules that are time compatible for n subcontractors. First, the egalitarian rule yields an equal profit to all subcontractors:
Example 3 The egalitarian profit-sharing rule φ EGAL ∈ F n is
where
It can be easily checked that φ(p, r, s) EGAL satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2, since it belongs to F RWRD with δ = ξ = 0. Moreover, φ(p, r, s) EGAL is defined so as to follow Assumptions 2-4. It is also worth noting that in our case the egalitarian rule coincides with the Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) solutions generalised to n players (e.g. Myerson 1997, p. 382 ).
Second, the exclusive rule gives the whole subcontractors' share to the innovator:
Example 4 The exclusive profit-sharing rule is
where µ > 0 is the innovator's share and µ + α n+1 + α n+2 = µ + β n+1 + β n+2 = 1.
Similarly to φ(p, r, s) EGAL , the exclusive rule φ(p, r, s) EXCL belongs to F RWRD with ξ = δ = µ and α i = β i = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, from Proposition 2 it follows that φ(p, r, s) EXCL is also time compatible. In other words, to ensure time compatibility, Proposition 2 implies that the innovator will be given the same share from cost reduction regardless of the size of the end-product price p relative to the reference price r.
Profit-sharing rules φ(p, r, s) EGAL and φ(p, r, s) EXCL can be characterised as the simplest time compatible profit-sharing rules from F RWRD . They also represent the opposing views with respect to equality; the egalitarian rule repays equally, irrespective of the contribution to cost reduction, whereas the exclusive rule only compensates the innovator (other subcontractors benefit indirectly through decreased end-product price). In this perspective, the exclusive rule is closer to utilitarianism, which strives to maximise the net benefit and is therefore the predominant way of thinking in business.
The disadvantage of φ(p, r, s) EXCL is that it does not compensate the target of the cost reduction if he/she is not the innovator (this is indeed possible, thanks to the open cost structures). Nevertheless, we can easily fix this by elaborating the combination profitsharing rule:
Example 5 The combination profit-sharing rule is
where α i = β i = 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {j} and index j denotes the target of the cost reduction. Moreover, δ, ξ > 0 denote the share to the innovator, denoted by index k.
In the most common case, where the innovator and the target of the cost reduction are the same (i.e. j = k), the combination rule φ(p, r, s) COMB reduces back to the exclusive rule φ(p, r, s) EXCL . Therefore, φ(p, r, s) COMB is time compatible if and only if α j + δ = β j + ξ = µ. In words, here Proposition 2 implies that the aggregate share of the target and the innovator stays the same regardless of the size of the end-product price p relative to the reference price r.
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4 Discussion
Implications to network relations
Increasing trust in SME networks can lead to efficiency improvement through reduced transaction costs, which are due to continuous partner search and monitoring (e.g. Hill 1990, Ring and Van de Ven 1994) . Nevertheless, the network maintains its competitiveness only if it is able to innovate and reduce costs continuously. In networks that have moved towards partnerships, continuous innovation needs to be driven by other factors than competition. One way to do this is open-book accounting, which, albeit considered important, may not alone offer sufficient means for continuous innovation. Instead, the network partners may need additional incentives to innovate and reduce costs.
Willingness to share the cost structure with other subcontractors depends on at least two conditions. First, the trust between the network partners needs to be at a level that rules out the misuse of shared information. In accordance with the contingency theory, the trust level depends on particular circumstances, which vary case by case (Kajüter and Kulmala 2005) . Second, from the principal's perspective, the markets for subcontracting are not perfect. Hence, although one subcontractor would find a way to reduce its costs, the principal could not purchase everything from the one due to capacity restrictions.
Therefore, from the subcontractor's perspective, it is useful to support the competitiveness of the network by sharing the cost structure with others: innovativeness increases when more people are familiar with the network's cost structure. It is also worth noting that the exact cost figures are not revealed. Sharing the figures would even be questionable in respect of the antitrust law.
In our case, bargaining power plays a role at two levels of supply-chain coordination.
First, the everyday improvement is based on trust and spontaneous cost reduction from 20 subcontractors. This is supported by the open books and profit sharing. Here, bargaining power influences the way profit-sharing rules are determined; a powerful principal can demand a larger share of profits. Second, if in the long run a subcontractor is not capable of sufficient cost reduction, it will be changed provided that a substitute exists. The availability of alternative subcontractors again reflects the principal's bargaining power.
Even though the principal had bargaining power in terms of threatening to change subcontractors, the execution of this threat, however, involves transaction costs. In our case, instead of using its bargaining power, the principal has chosen to increase trust in the network, assuming to decrease the transaction costs in this way. Since frequent change of subcontractors and fostering trust are mutually exclusive strategies, the principal has in fact temporarily renounced part of its bargaining power. Of course, the principal can at any time change back to competitive strategy and start changing the subcontractors, but this would ruin the slow process of trust creation (cf. Wolters and Schuller 1997).
Practical implications
The theoretical analysis of this paper has the following practical implications. First, the network partners need explicit, ex-ante agreed rules for profit sharing in cases of costreduction. These rules share the benefit from cost-reductions between the network partners and the end-product price. Second, not just any kind of profit-sharing rule is suitable as an incentive. In a multilateral network, a suitable and simple rule is the combination profit-sharing rule φ COMB (see Example 5), which rewards the innovator and the target of the cost-reduction. Third, a general proportional profit-sharing rule that rewards the innovator more than others should give a greater proportion to the innovator if the network's end-product price is higher than the competitors' price. Moreover, the total share of all the subcontractors, including the innovator, should be bigger if the network's end-product price is lower than the competitors' price (Proposition 2). Otherwise the network may drift to an 'innovation lock', where the innovators wait for others to announce their costreductions first. This leads to suboptimal network behaviour in terms of unnecessarily delayed cost-reduction. In our analysis, we did not account for the time-value of money since it would not change our conclusions; discounting future cash-flows only makes it less profitable to delay cost-reduction.
If the network is well aware of its position in the markets, it may have knowledge of its competitors' prices, which determine the efficient frontier in terms of price and customerperceived value. Moreover, the efficient frontier defines the reference price for the network. If the network prices its end product above the reference price, it is supposed to lose market share, whereas a lower price than the reference price leads to increased market share. However, it is not optimal to go far below the reference price, because the marginal utility in terms of increased market share decreases when price is decreased. Thus, when the network has reached a 'low-enough' level for its end-product price, it is wise to share the benefits from further cost reductions as increased profits to the network partners.
A profit-sharing strategy that accounts for market conditions can be easily implemented using the φ COMB -rule. For instance, let 50% of the saving be used to decrease the endproduct price whenever the price is above the reference price and 10% otherwise. The rest, i.e. 50% or 90%, respectively, is allocated to increase the network partners' profits.
Moreover, a reward of e.g. 10% of the saving will be given to the innovator. Using these percentages the rule becomes
where for all i = 1, . . . , n, the share α i = β i = 0.4 if i is the target of the cost reduction and α i = β i = 0 otherwise. The innovator's share is δ = ξ = 0.1. The principal's share is 0 or 0.4, depending on whether the network's end-product price is, respectively, higher (p ≥ r) or lower (p < r) than the competitors' price. Finally, the whole network benefits from the price reduction, which is 0.5 if p ≥ r and 0.1 otherwise. pared to continuous competition, it sounds nicer to pay for creating trust rather than for monitoring network partners. Of course, the optimal solution would be to make the network partners compete on cost-efficiency, while still maintaining mutual trust. Steering the network to such relations is a challenge.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have described the case of a roof-assembly network where open-book accounting was successfully implemented. This case raised the motivation to study profitsharing rules that would work as incentives for network partners to reduce their costs.
Identifying opportunities for cost-reduction, i.e. cost-reduction options, and measuring the size of the potential savings would be easier due to open books. Strongly synergetic with the open-book practises, the use of incentive profit-sharing rules encourages the network partners to continuous innovation.
Based on the theoretical analysis, we presented three different profit-sharing rules that can be implemented in a network with many subcontractors. First, the egalitarian rule yields an equal share to all subcontractors; second, the exclusive rule rewards only the innovator; third, the combination rule repays both the innovator and the target of the cost reduction. In particular, the combination rule, together with open-book accounting, seems to work as a suitable incentive for continuous cost-reduction and innovation in a network. The combination rule is practically feasible due to its transparency, minimal information needs, and fairness towards contributors, which is essential when fostering trust in collaborative networks.
This paper suggests both empirical and theoretical avenues for further research. First, more case studies of implementing and using profit-sharing rules are called for. Second, from the perspective of the network companies, allocating cost-savings between the companies' profit-increases and the end-product price-reduction is essentially a bicriteria profit-sharing problem; each network company derives utility, first, privately from the increase in its profit, and second, publicly from the decrease of the end-product price, which improves the competitiveness of the whole network. Hence, the networks could be studied using the concepts of multicriteria game theory with both private criteria, i.e.
the companies' profits, and public criteria, i.e. the network's end-product price (for more information on multicriteria games, see Voorneveld et al. 1999, Voorneveld and van den Nouweland 2001) . Finally, more research is needed to clarify when it is profitable to aim at partnerships and when competition is more efficient. Second, if p < r, the owner can wait so that, at time t 1 , r decreases below p, in which case the benefit to the owner may not increase (by (i) of Proposition 1). Now, let φ k = (β k + ξ)s 1 and φ k = (α k + δ)s 1 denote the benefit to the owner when τ 1 < t 1 and τ 1 > t 1 , respectively. Again, φ is time compatible if and only if φ k ≥ φ k Figure Captions 
